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Synesthesia is a fairly common condition in which individuals experience atypical
responses (such as color experiences) in association with certain types of stimuli (such
as non-colored letters). Although synesthesia has been described for centuries, only very
recently has there been an explosive growth of systematic scientific examinations of
this condition. In this article, we review and critically evaluate current methods for both
assessing synesthesia and examining its psychological basis, including the “test-retest”
procedure, online battery assessments, and behavioral experiments. We highlight the
limitations of these methods for understanding the nature of this complex condition and
propose potential solutions to address some of these limitations. We also provide a set
of markers that aid in distinguishing synesthesia from other closely related psychological
phenomena.
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INTRODUCTION
Synesthesia is a condition in which individuals experience atypi-
cal responses to certain types of stimuli, in addition to the typical
responses elicited by those stimuli. For example, a synesthete
may perceive tastes when seeing certain shapes or might per-
ceive colors when seeing achromatic letters. Synesthesia comes in
many forms, covering a wide range of sensory interactions both
cross-modally and within a single modality1.
Over the years, a variety of research programs have emerged
to better understand this condition. Some research on synesthesia
is focused on determining how and why synesthetic associations
are developed or acquired, and the patterns, if any, that govern
them (Watson et al., 2010, 2012; Witthoft and Winawer, 2013).
Other research has been devoted to determining the nature and
characteristic features of synesthetic associations, raising ques-
tions, for example, regarding the types of stimuli that can trigger
synesthetic responses (Ramachandran et al., 2002). But perhaps
the most pressing questions pertaining to synesthetic associations
concern their psychological kind. Are they genuinely perceptual,
as many claim? In other words, are synesthetic responses the out-
puts of sensory modalities, exhibiting features that correspond to
the sensory qualities of stimuli such as color, shape, and sound?
Or are they purely cognitive responses? Are they mnemonic
associations? Or are they some combination thereof?
While significant steps forward have been taken in synesthesia
research in the past couple of decades, there is still further to
go when it comes to establishing conclusive answers to these
questions using objective measures. Some of the biggest strides
1For a comprehensive list, as well as a discussion of the different forms that
synesthesia can take, see Novich et al. (2011).
are being made using neuroimaging techniques that are help-
ing to reveal the neural basis of synesthesia. While we think
these techniques are particularly promising for understanding
synesthesia, in this short review, we focus instead on surveying
and critically evaluating popular behavioral strategies for assess-
ing and understanding synesthesia. We highlight the limitations
of these strategies when it comes to both accurately assessing
cases of synesthesia and examining the nature of the responses
involved, and we propose potential solutions to some of these
limitations along the way.
ASSESSING SYNESTHESIA
In order to assess or diagnose a psychological condition, one
must, of course, know what to look for. Although much about
synesthesia is still unknown, and novel forms and varieties of the
condition may manifest themselves, it will nonetheless be use-
ful to highlight some characteristics of synesthesia that serve to
distinguish it from other perceptual phenomena, such as visual
imagery and certain forms of imagistic memory. There are three
such characteristic features: (1) automaticity, (2) reliability, and
(3) consistency 2. First, there is ample evidence that synesthetic
associations are automatic in nature (Lupiáñez and Callejas, 2006;
Jarick et al., 2011). They are typically produced outside the
intentional control of the individual and cannot be directly inhib-
ited. The automaticity of synesthesia helps to distinguish it from
2In addition to automaticity, reliability, and consistency most definitions of
synesthesia either state or imply that the synesthetic response occurs con-
sciously. However, as of yet there has been no empirical work done to deter-
mine whether these responses may sometimes occur unconsciously, similar
to how subliminal perception occurs (though see Mattingley et al., 2001). As
such, we do not include consciousness as a feature of synesthetic associations.
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 763 | 1
Mylopoulos and Ro Synesthesia: a critical review
paradigm cases of mental imagery. While hearing a certain sound
may lead one to imagine certain scenes or colors, for exam-
ple, such visual imagery is typically under a significant degree
of intentional control. One can usually start or stop imagining
something at will. This is not to deny that synesthetic responses
have qualities—for example, shapes and colors—that are simi-
lar to or even the same as those exhibited by mental imagery.
However, synesthetic responses are, at the very least, distinguish-
able from mental imagery in virtue of their automaticity.
Second, it is typically the case that synesthetes reliably experi-
ence synesthetic responses when presented with triggering stim-
uli. When synesthetes come into perceptual contact with the trig-
gering stimulus, their responses will be induced. These responses
are not transient or inconsistent, though they may sometimes
be when induced neuropharmacologically, for example, by psy-
choactive, hallucinogenic substances 3. Indeed, synesthesia is
often present from early childhood onwards (Cytowic, 2002).
This helps to distinguish the condition from ordinary associa-
tions grounded in memory. One sometimes has vivid mnemonic
imagery associated with specific smells or sounds, for example,
and these memories may sometimes even arise automatically. But
it is uncommon for these to be reliably generated and persis-
tent throughout an individual’s life in the way that synesthetic
responses are reported to be.
Finally, although there is variability across synesthetes, synes-
thetic associations within an individual appear to remain rela-
tively consistent over time in that the same types of stimuli (e.g.,
specific auditory tones) tend to elicit the same types of synes-
thetic responses (e.g., specific colors)4,5 (Dixon et al., 2000). This
feature, too, helps to distinguish synesthetic associations from
ordinary mental imagery, which displays more flexible associa-
tions. But as Simner (2012) argues, consistencymay not be central
to synesthesia in the way that many have supposed. The problem
is that many of the tests used to assess synesthesia, as we will see,
treat consistency as the main measure of synesthetic association.
As a result, the synesthetes who are examined in the psycho-
logical literature are all those that exhibit consistency in their
associations. This bias may have created an inflated sense of how
common this characteristic really is among synesthetic associa-
tions, to the point where it has become a defining feature of the
condition. We therefore restrict ourselves to the following claim:
when consistency is present, this provides evidence in favor of
the relevant association being a synesthetic one. However, when
3And there is a question, furthermore, about whether the experiences induced
by drugs are appropriately classified as synesthesia. Hubbard (2007), for exam-
ple, notes that congenital synesthetes have synesthetic experiences that typi-
cally involve simple colors andmovements, while drug-induced hallucinations
are often complex scenes or images.
4We use the term “association” loosely, to characterize whatever relationship
holds between the stimulus trigger and the synesthetic percept. For some
synesthetes, this relationship is much tighter than the term suggests, as illus-
trated by the following description of one synesthete: “The shapes are not
distinct from hearing them—they are part of what hearing is. The vibra-
phone, the musical instrument, makes a round shape. Each is like a little gold
ball falling. That’s what the sound is; it couldn’t possibly be anything else”
(Cytowic, 2002, p. 69).
5This is not to rule out cases in which the concurrent is nonspecific or changes
slightly or gradually over time (e.g., Eagleman et al., 2007).
consistency is absent, this is not evidence against the relevant
association being a synesthetic one.
Given that assessment strategies are used as diagnostic tools
for establishing whether a given individual is a synesthete, it is
important that they are able to establish that certain reported
associations exhibit each of these characteristics and perhaps
others that remain to be identified. One of the more widely
accepted measures for determining whether one has synesthe-
sia is the test-retest procedure, known as the “test of gen-
uineness” (TOG) among synesthesia researchers. The TOG is
considered by some to be the “gold standard” of synesthesia
assessment. In this procedure, synesthetes are asked to indicate,
either through verbal report or color swatch matching, the char-
acter of their synesthetic responses to certain stimuli, and then
they are retested—often without warning—as much as a year or
more later (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Cytowic, 2002; Asher et al.,
2006).
The rationale is that if a person has synesthesia, their consis-
tency of responses at the retest phase will be significantly higher
than those without synesthesia, who are told to simply assign
associations to the same set of stimuli. For example, Baron-Cohen
et al. (1993) found that 92.3% of the reported synesthetes they
tested gave consistent responses when they were retested one year
later without warning, whereas this was true of only 37.6% of con-
trol subjects who were tested one week later with warning. This
finding, and others like it, are made all the more impressive by the
fact that synesthetic responses are often very precise, for example,
sometimes with highly specific hues and shades in grapheme-
color synesthesia (Eagleman et al., 2007). In cases where there is
a high consistency of responses, therefore, it is likely the result
of a stable association. The TOG can therefore provide strong
evidence that reported associations possess one of the common
characteristics of synesthesia. If one fails the TOG, however, in
line with our earlier caveats, this alone is not evidence against a
reported association being a synesthetic one, since it may simply
be that the association is not consistent.
The TOG faces a number of shortcomings. Response consis-
tencies over time do not by themselves indicate whether the asso-
ciations in question are automatic, or whether they are instead,
in some cases, being conjured up at will. Moreover, they do not
by themselves establish the reliability of the associations, as typi-
cally only two instances of each association are observed—once in
the testing phase and then again in the retest phase. In addition,
this procedure provides no evidence as to whether the associa-
tions are cognitive, perceptual, mnemonic, or some combination
of these. It might be that some individuals who are classified
as having grapheme-color synesthesia may simply have better or
stronger memories overall, as it has been reported in at least one
case study (Smilek et al., 2002; see also Tammet, 2009, p. 73) and
in a larger group study (Radvansky et al., 2011). They may thus
have robust mnemonic associations of certain colors with cer-
tain letters or numbers, though these enhanced memory effects
may be modest in size (see Yaro and Ward, 2007; Rothen et al.,
2012)6. When taking the TOG, some individuals may simply be
6Smilek et al. (2002) and Tammet (2009) suggest that synesthetes have
stronger memories due to their synesthesia, but the causal relationship may
run in the opposite direction, which would be problematic for the TOG.
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voluntarily associating in memory rather than automatically per-
ceiving the color red with the letter “A,” just as one may recall his
or her grandmother’s face when smelling freshly baked chocolate
chip cookies. These associations, which may in some other cases
be automatic, could have been learned early on in childhood, such
as through television, books, toys, or refrigerator magnets (see
Witthoft and Winawer, 2006, 2013) (Figure 1). Though volun-
tarily associating with superior memory is unlikely to account for
all cases in which consistency is displayed, our point here is that it
may be operative in enough cases that the reliability of the TOG
is diminished.
We propose that this issuemay possibly be addressed by adding
to the TOG a further test and retest using stimuli that are not
claimed by self-reported synesthetes to yield synesthetic associ-
ations, such as stimuli from a sensory modality that does not
produce synesthetic responses. For example, a grapheme-color
synesthete could be tested with auditory stimuli. The results of
this test-retest for non-synesthetic associations could then be
compared with those involving the reportedly synesthetic asso-
ciations. This would control for the role that superior mem-
ory may play in generating the consistent results within each
individual.
We also note some complications regarding the role of mem-
ory in synesthetic associations. We may distinguish among three
types of sensory associations: (1) associations between a stimulus
and a response that are generated by willful perceptual imagery
(whether mnemonically based or not), (2) associations between
a stimulus and a response that are generated by automatic per-
ceptual imagery that are also mnemonically based, and (3) asso-
ciations between a stimulus and a response that are generated
by automatic perceptual imagery, but that are not mnemonically
based. We are inclined not to view the first kind of association
FIGURE 1 | Letter-color associations may have been acquired early on
in development through common associations between letters and
colors, as illustrated in these toys.
as synesthetic, since it is not automatic in character. We take the
third kind of association to be very similar to, if not the same, as
non-imagery based synesthetic associations. There is a question,
however, about whether the second type of association is properly
understood as synesthetic association, involving as it does an indi-
rect pathway between the stimulus and response—going through
mnemonic systems and then back to perceptual systems, rather
than directly through perceptual systems. We leave this question
open for future theorizing.
Given the subjective nature of the responses generated by
synesthesia, especially problematic are online assessments or bat-
teries for this condition (e.g., Eagleman et al., 2007). In these
assessments, individuals are given a battery of tests aiming to cap-
ture any synesthetic responses the online test takers may possess.
These assessments suffer from two main flaws. The first is a prob-
lem for online assessments or batteries more generally, which is
that the way in which one responds on such batteries cannot be
directly monitored. Thus, subjects may use inappropriate strate-
gies, may take the battery on several occasions (see Birnbaum,
2004), may not respond consistently just to get through the assess-
ment faster, or may use notes or visual aids to produce their
consistent responses. They may also use other cues, such as spa-
tial ones to indicate a “perceived” color on a color bar or wheel
that might increase accuracy and consistency in their responses.
For example, if a color bar always has the same colors in the
same order from the top to the bottom of a monitor, as in some
synesthesia batteries, subjects may use position on the bar rela-
tive to the monitor, as well as other potential screen landmarks,
to increase their precision7 . The inability to verify whether sub-
jects are responding appropriately to the assessment, while a
general problem with online tests, is especially problematic in
the case of assessing synesthesia, where there are already difficul-
ties in classifying the condition, and in determining how to carry
these assessments out so as to capture its main subjective fea-
tures. In addition, there is a bias present in such assessments since
many of those who take the test believe themselves to already have
synesthesia8.
Another problem with the online battery is that, like the TOG,
it cannot establish the automaticity or reliability of synesthetic
associations. It is therefore not comprehensive in the way that
a serious assessment of a psychological condition must be if it
is to achieve reliable results. In addition, though frequency esti-
mates of synesthesia are not commonly based solely on such
measures, any that are (e.g., Novich et al., 2011 regarding the
frequency of types of synesthesia) should be interpreted cau-
tiously.
We acknowledge that there is a benefit in using online bat-
teries in that they allow researchers to cast a much wider net
than laboratory studies and to thereby collect data on a larger
pool of individuals. But we propose that, in order for the larger
set of data to guide research appropriately, these tests be used in
7We note that this may also be problematic in laboratory studies.
8Another potential issue is that web-based samples may not be representative
in the way required (Skitka and Sargis, 2006). But this is a general issue in
recruiting subjects for laboratory studies as well.
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tandem with laboratory studies to validate the results collected
online.
UNDERSTANDING SYNESTHESIA: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PARADIGMS
In this section, we explore three commonly used paradigms for
examining the character of synesthetic responses. We stress some
concerns with the current state of the literature, and offer some
potential remedies.
STROOP TASK
Early attempts to explore the nature of synesthetic associa-
tions made use of a variation of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935;
MacLeod, 1991), in which color naming responses are substan-
tially delayed for words that spell out incompatible colors (e.g.,
naming the color red when the word “GREEN” is printed or
displayed in red). In this variation, synesthetes are presented
with graphemes that are written in a color that is either congru-
ent or incongruent with the synesthetic colors that they report
associating with these graphemes. So, for example, if a synes-
thete reports associating the letter “A” with the color red, she
would be presented with a red “A” in the congruent condi-
tion, and an “A” in some other color in the incongruent con-
dition. The subjects are then asked to name aloud the color
of the grapheme. Synesthetes tend to respond more slowly on
incongruent trials than on congruent trials compared with con-
trols, for whom no effect on reaction times is found (Dixon
et al., 2000; Mattingley et al., 2001; Lupiáñez and Callejas,
2006).
The Stroop task is a valuable tool for establishing the auto-
maticity of synesthetic associations. The slower reaction times on
the incongruent trials are interpreted as an inability to inhibit the
interfering synesthetic response—and this is a key characteristic
of automatic association. As this is not something that the TOG
or online battery tests probe, we propose that a more compre-
hensive assessment of synesthesia may combine these tests with a
Stroop-like test, so that the automatic dimension of the condition
may be examined. In general, a successful assessment strategy for
synesthesia may need to combine multiple tests in order to get a
clearer profile of the condition within any given individual.
But, as others have noted (e.g., Hubbard et al., 2005; Gheri
et al., 2008), these results do not help to establish that synes-
thetic responses are perceptual in nature since the interfer-
ence could be due to purely cognitive rather than perceptual
processes. Indeed, Elias et al. (2003) used this variant of the
Stroop paradigm to compare the performance of a grapheme-
color synesthete and a control who was trained on semantic
color-number associations using a set of specific cross-stitch
knitting patterns over a period of 8 years. For example, the
number 5 might indicate that one should use red thread, and
would thereby be strongly associated with the color red. They
found that both the synesthete and the semantically trained
subject were slower to name colors of numbers that were incon-
gruent with their specific associations, suggesting that inter-
ference in this Stroop paradigm need not be perceptual in
nature. Colizoli et al. (2012) similarly found Stroop inter-
ference effects in a training study using non-synesthetes. In
light of these results, the Stroop paradigm, like the test-retest
procedure, may be inappropriate for objectively establishing
the perceptual character of synesthesia, at least when used in
isolation.
There are two obstacles to this conclusion, however. The first is
that other training studies using non-synesthetes have not found
interference effects post-training (Rothen et al., 2011; Kusnir and
Thut, 2012), so further research is needed in order to determine
whether interference in the Stroop paradigm can be the result
of learned, non-perceptual associations. Second, the magnitude
of the interference found in studies with trained non-synesthetes
may be smaller than that found for synesthetes in the Stroop task,
though direct comparisons between studies is difficult because of
the different stimuli and scales that were used (see also Elias et al.,
2003, in which the trained non-synesthete displayed more inter-
ference on one of the tasks). This suggests a more subtle difference
between synesthetic automaticity and that of non-synesthetic
associations. Using neuroimaging along with the Stroop task will
help to establish both the perceptual nature of synesthesia, if per-
ceptual regions of the brain such as color areas are activated, as
well as the automaticity of these effects, given that the Stroop task
is a reliable measure of this feature.
VISUAL SEARCH TASKS
Another popular paradigm used to understand synesthetic asso-
ciations explores the relationship between synesthesia and atten-
tion. In a visual search task, one is presented with an array of
stimuli and asked to respond to the presence or absence of a
“target” stimulus that differs from the other “distractor” stimuli
on the basis of some visual feature, such as color, orientation,
or shape. When the target stimulus differs from the distractor
stimuli with respect to just one of these features, it tends to grab
attention, regardless of the number of distractors. One commonly
offered explanation for this is that individual features of stim-
uli are processed automatically and in parallel by different parts
of the visual system before they are bound together by attention,
and thus seem to “pop-out” from the feature search visual array
(Treisman and Gelade, 1980). Applying this to synesthesia, the
rationale is that if a synesthetic color exhibits this pop-out effect
during a visual search task on which the target differs from dis-
tractors on the basis of a unique feature, then it must be processed
preattentively in the same way that veridical colors are in such
tasks.
To test this hypothesis, Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001)
conducted a pioneering study, where they briefly presented two
projector synesthetes and forty controls with arrays of achromatic
graphemes, where one group of graphemes formed an embed-
ded shape (square, rectangle, triangle, or diamond). For example,
the array might consist of a triangle of 2 s amongst background
filled with 5s. The particular graphemes used to form the embed-
ded shape were predicted to trigger synesthetic colors for the two
synesthetes. Participants in the experiment were asked to identify
the embedded shape. The two synesthetes were significantly bet-
ter than controls at successfully identifying the embedded shape
from a set of four options, presumably because the graphemes
induced colors that popped out from the background. However,
other studies seeking to replicate this result have not all been
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Table 1 | A summary of studies testing the performance of
synesthetes using visual search tasks.
Authors of study Type of visual Number of Superior
search task synesthetes performance for
tested synesthetes?
Nijboer et al., 2011 Single target 9 synesthetes No
Palmeri et al., 2002 Single target 1 synesthete Yes
Laeng et al., 2004 Single target 1 synesthete Yes
Edquist et al., 2006 Single target 14 synesthetes No
Sagiv et al., 2006 Single target 2 synesthetes No
Gheri et al., 2008 Single target 7 synesthetes No
Ramachandran and
Hubbard, 2001
Embedded
figure
2 synesthetes Yes
Hubbard et al., 2005 Embedded
figure
6 synesthetes Yes
Rothen and Meier,
2009
Embedded
figure
13 synesthetes No
Ward et al., 2010 Embedded
figure
36 synesthetes Yes
Hubbard et al., 2006 Embedded
figure
1 synesthete Yes
successful, and some with even larger samples of synesthetes (see
Table 1).
Studies using a more traditional visual search paradigm, in
which participants are not asked to identify an embedded shape,
but rather to locate a single target stimulus among distractors,
have come up with mixed results. For example, Palmeri et al.
(2002) found that the synesthete WO, who associates a specific
color with the digit “2,” was both significantly faster than the con-
trols at spotting a target “2” among a set of “5” s and showed a
significantly smaller effect of set size on search time. Laeng et al.
(2004) also found superior performance in one synesthete using
the same task. However, others have not arrived at the same find-
ings (see Table 1). Until these contradictory results across studies
can be sorted out, the general conclusion that synesthetes outper-
form controls on visual search tasks, either the embedded figure
variant or the single target version, is not warranted.
A further concern is that it is not clear that the superior per-
formance of synesthetes, in cases where it is indeed present, is due
to synesthetic responses preattentively generating the pop-out
effect. Ward et al. (2010) examined this very assumption. They
conducted a study with 36 synesthetes, using Ramachandran
and Hubbard’s embedded-figure task, but this time including
an assessment of the synesthetes’ self-reports during the exper-
iment. They found that, although synesthetes did tend to out-
perform the controls, most synesthetes reported that they did
not experience synesthetic responses across the entire array dur-
ing the task. Perhaps more importantly, the synesthetes that
did experience synesthetic responses reported them as appearing
piecemeal, rather than all at once, suggesting that these expe-
riences depend on attention and perhaps other higher-order
processes, and do not therefore pop-out like veridical colors
in such tasks. As an example of a typical participant’s report,
Ward et al. offer this revealing quotation: “I definitely do NOT
see all the colors in one go. I have to attend to the sym-
bols/shapes or process them in some way, and then it has a
color attributed to it. It’s not like I could be looking somewhere
else, and in the corner I see a shape made out of shapes of one
color.”
This verbal report is corroborated by a recent study by Nijboer
et al. (2011) using a visual search task on which synesthetes and
controls had to spot a single target digit among a set of distrac-
tor digits, for example, a “2” among a set of “5” s. An interesting
feature of their experiment is that participants were required to
make just a single, direct eye movement to the target, rather than
being allowed to wander their eyes around the array. The target
and distractors were either all gray (achromatic condition) or all
colored. The target stimulus was always a different color from
the distractors. Nijboer et al. found that synesthetes performed
comparably to controls in both the chromatic and achromatic
conditions. Importantly, accuracy decreased with increases in set
size in the achromatic condition for both the synesthetes and the
controls, indicating that no pop-out effect occurred for either
group. Furthermore, there was no effect of set size on accuracy in
the chromatic condition, indicating that pop-out did occur in this
condition for both groups. This evidence seems to cast into doubt
the claim that synesthetic responses are generated preattentively.
Perhaps a better way to assess whether attention is necessary
for synesthetic responses is to determine whether perceptual load
(e.g., Lavie and Tsal, 1994; Lavie, 1995) affects the occurrence
of these responses. Perceptual load refers to the amount of per-
ceptual information in a stimulus or a set of stimuli, with more
attentional resources being required for processing when per-
ceptual load is high. In particular, if attention is required for
a synesthetic response to occur, then these responses should be
measured more frequently under conditions of low perceptual
load vs. high perceptual load. For example, synesthetes should
report experiencing synesthetic responses more often when the
triggering stimuli are presented under low load conditions.
PERCEPTUAL CROWDING EXPERIMENTS
An additional paradigm used to examine synesthesia takes advan-
tage of another well-known perceptual effect. A grapheme pre-
sented alone in the periphery is relatively easy to visually identify,
whereas it is much more difficult to identify when it is flanked
by distractor graphemes—an effect known as “crowding” (Flom
et al., 1963; Bouma, 1970; Chung et al., 2001; Levi, 2008).
However, identification in the flanking condition is made easier if
the target grapheme is a different color than the distractors (Gheri
et al., 2007).
Grapheme-color synesthetes have been tested using this
paradigm in order to determine if synesthetic “colors” facilitate
identification of a flanked target in the same way that regular col-
ors do. Here, too, results have not been consistent. Ramachandran
andHubbard (2001) tested a synesthete on this task, who reported
that his synesthetic “color” response was triggered, but only on
this basis was he able to identify the flanked grapheme. In this
case, the synesthetic “color” merely helped him to infer what
the grapheme must have been, rather than helping him to con-
sciously see the grapheme in the way that regular colors allow
under the same conditions. Hubbard et al. (2005) also performed
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a crowding experiment using six synesthetes and found evidence
for superior performance on the task over the control subjects in
only three of the six synesthetes. Thus, the synesthetes as a whole
did not exhibit significantly superior performance over controls
for the task, as one might expect if synesthetic colors behaved like
regular colors.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: IS SYNESTHESIA “OUT THERE”
OR “ALL IN THE HEAD”?
What are we to make of the inconsistent results that plague
the literature on synesthesia? A tempting solution is to appeal
to individual differences among synesthetes to explain them.
One distinction that is sometimes drawn in the literature is
that between “projector” and “associator” synesthetes (Smilek
et al., 2001; Dixon et al., 2004; Dixon and Smilek, 2005; Ward
and Mattingley, 2006; Ward et al., 2007, 2010; Jarick et al.,
2011). Projector synesthetes report experiencing their synes-
thetic responses (e.g., color in grapheme-color synesthesia) as
being located “out there in space,” whereas associator synes-
thetes report experiencing them as being present instead in their
“mind’s eye.”
There are two problems with appealing to the associa-
tor/projector distinction to explain the varying performance of
synesthetes in the tasks we have just discussed: (1) Most of the
motivation for positing this distinction stems from subjective
reports that are difficult to interpret, and (2) the objective meth-
ods used for evaluating the associator/projector distinction fall
short of establishing it.
Although there is divergence among the subjective reports
of synesthetes, which is in large part the basis for the associ-
ator/projector distinction, it is difficult to determine whether
this is due to differing experiences or simply varying idiolects.
Indeed, some of these reports have been found to be inconsis-
tent with one another. Edquist et al. (2006) carried out a study
in which one part required that fourteen grapheme-color synes-
thetes respond to a questionnaire that asked them to indicate
their agreement with the following: “the color is out there in
space,” “the color is in my mind’s eye,” or “neither.” Strikingly,
the results of the questionnaire revealed seemingly conflicting
reports within individual subjects. For example, two synesthetes
agreed with the sentence “the color is out there in space,” but on
a separate questionnaire administered subsequently, these same
two synesthetes also strongly agreed with the sentence “the color
is in my mind’s eye.” And another three synesthetes who indi-
cated their agreement with the sentence “the color is in my
mind’s eye” also agreed with the sentence “the color looks like
it is on the page.” These competing responses not only high-
light the need for caution in using and interpreting subjective
reports for the purposes of theorizing about synesthesia and the
varieties thereof, but also raise general concerns regarding the
classification of individuals as synesthetes based solely on such
reports.
One way to mitigate these concerns might be to more carefully
choose the wording involved in questionnaires intended to probe
the experiences of synesthetes, such that ambiguities are avoided.
For instance, the reason some synesthetes may have agreed that
their synesthetic responses are in their “mind’s eye” as well as
being “out there on the page,” is that despite experiencing their
synesthetic responses as being out there on the page, they still
retain the belief that they are not actually properties of exter-
nal objects. And insofar as they hold this belief, they might
be inclined to respond that the synesthetic response is in their
“mind’s eye.” Their seemingly inconsistent responses to the ques-
tionnaire might have been an attempt to reflect this specific
stance.
Given the difficulties involved in interpreting subjective
reports, the most reliable source of evidence will likely come
from objective measures that corroborate these reports—at least
when they are sufficiently well-understood. The main behav-
ioral task used for these purposes is the variation of the Stroop
paradigm described earlier (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991). Those
who identify as projector synesthetes tend to be faster at naming
synesthetic colors of letters over their veridical colors, whereas
those who identify as associator synesthetes tend to be faster at
naming veridical colors over synesthetic colors (Dixon et al., 2004;
Ward et al., 2007). Projectors also display larger Stroop interfer-
ence effects than associators when it comes to their performance
on the color-naming task.
From these findings, Dixon et al. (2004) suggest that synes-
thetic responses in the Stroop task are more automatic for pro-
jectors than for associators because external projections of color
are more difficult to ignore than internal ones. Ward et al. (2007),
having replicated the results of Dixon et al., elaborate on this by
offering an explanation in terms of shifting spatial frames of ref-
erence. They suggest that in order to successfully complete the
task, associators must attend to the grapheme located on the
computer screen and then retrieve the corresponding color from
a different spatial location (i.e., their “mind’s eye”). This slows
them down relative to projectors, who need only attend at or near
the location of the grapheme to report their synesthetic colors.
As for projectors being slower at naming veridical colors than
synesthetic colors, Ward et al. suggest that the real and synes-
thetic color in the same location leads to competition between
the two.
These interpretations, while perhaps promising, require much
further support before they can be used to validate the projec-
tor/associator distinction. The results might be explained equally
well by those reporting to be projectors simply having stronger
grapheme-color associations than those reporting to be associ-
ators, rather than a different quality in their perceptual experi-
ence, or any perceptual experience whatsoever for that matter.
A more solid result comes from van Leeuwen et al. (2011),
who found in an fMRI study using dynamic causal modeling
that the synesthetic responses of projector grapheme-color synes-
thetes were driven primarily by bottom–up processes via the
fusiform gyrus, while those of the associator synesthetes were gen-
erated mainly by top–down processes via the superior parietal
lobe (see also Rouw and Scholte, 2007). We propose that until
more reliable evidence along these lines is gathered regarding the
purported projector/associator distinction, this distinction can-
not help to explain away the inconsistencies in the literature on
synesthesia.
Another distinction that is sometimes appealed to in
characterizing individual differences in synesthesia is that
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between “higher” and “lower” synesthesia (Ramachandran et al.,
2002)9 . Higher synesthetes are characterized as those individuals
whose synesthetic responses may be triggered in the absence of
an inducing physical stimulus, just by thinking about or imagin-
ing the relevant stimulus. Lower synesthetes are those for whom
the presence of the inducing physical stimulus is required in
order to experience a synesthetic response. Higher synesthetes
are also characterized in a second way, as those individuals
for whom the conceptual properties, and not merely the sen-
sory properties, of a physical stimulus trigger their synesthetic
responses. For example, a higher grapheme-color synesthete that
associates the number five with the color red might experi-
ence a red sensation in response to the written word “FIVE,”
the roman numeral “V,” a cluster of five dots as on a rolling
die, and the symbol “5,” all of which differ in their sensory
properties but share in common the conceptual property of rep-
resenting the number five (see, e.g., Ward and Sagiv, 2007).
Lower synesthetes are thought not to have synesthetic experiences
that are sensitive to the conceptual properties of stimuli to this
degree10.
Some evidence for this distinction derives once again from
subjective reports (e.g., Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001).
However, here too the distinction is not well-established by
9Some have suggested that the higher vs. lower synesthete distinction maps
onto the associator vs. projector synesthete distinction (Dixon et al., 2004;
Dixon and Smilek, 2005) Indeed, it may be that there is only one dis-
tinction between higher/associator synesthesia and between lower/projector
synesthesia. This way of distinguishing different types of synesthesias may
be reasonable, but higher synesthetes sometimes have no inducing stimulus
onto which to project. In these cases, higher synesthetes behave like associator
synesthetes and would be classified differently. In general, it may be impor-
tant to keep these pairs of synesthesia types conceptually distinct, since one
is based on the nature of the inducing stimulus, and the other is based on
the nature of the synesthetic experience, and higher synesthetes do, at least
sometimes, respond to physical stimuli, as well as imagined or thought about
stimuli. Moreover, Ward et al. (2007) administered a probing questionnaire to
fourteen synesthetes that had been previously classified as either projectors or
associators and found no evidence to suggest that the projectors were more
likely to be lower synesthetes or that the associators were more likely to be
higher synesthetes.
10It is important to note, however, that being a lower synesthete, in the sense
just described, does not mean that the way a physical stimulus is conceptual-
ized makes no difference to the induced synesthetic response. Ramachandran
and Hubbard (2001) used ambiguous stimuli on two synesthetes that were
classified as lower grapheme-color synesthetes because only Arabic numerals
evoke colors for them, whereas other stimuli that represent numerosity do not.
But they found that when presented with the words “THE CAT,” in which they
used identical, ambiguous symbols for the “H” and the “A” (Selfridge, 1955),
both synesthetes reported seeing their usual colors for “H” and “A.” The qual-
ity of their synesthetic experiences seemed to depend on whether they saw the
identical symbol as an “H” or as an “A.” This finding related to ambiguous
stimuli has been reported by others as well (Myles et al., 2003). Thus, there is
evidence to suggest that the way that a stimulus is conceptualized makes a dif-
ference for the induced photism, even in lower synesthetes. This somewhat
blurs the boundary between higher and lower synesthesia as characterized
by sensitivity to conceptual properties rather than just perceptual properties,
since both seem to involve such sensitivity to some degree. Consequently, it
may be more reasonable to primarily characterize higher synesthesia as that
whichmay be triggered by thought or imagination alone and lower synesthesia
as that which requires the presence of physical inducing stimuli.
objective measures. Dixon et al. (2000) attempted to pro-
vide some experimental evidence for this higher category of
synesthesia using a variant of the Stroop paradigm. They pre-
sented the grapheme-color synesthete, C, with arithmetic prob-
lems and asked her to calculate the solution. The solution was
always a number that would typically elicit in C a report of a
highly specific color experience. After calculating each sum, C
then had to name the color of a patch that was either congru-
ent or incongruent with that of the response triggered by the sum
that she had just calculated. They found that C performed faster
on congruent vs. incongruent trials, suggesting that, for her, hav-
ing a thought about a specific number is enough to trigger the
corresponding association.
Even if one accepts this study as conclusive evidence of the
higher vs. lower synesthete distinction, it would not account for
the inconsistent results discussed in the previous section. Higher
synesthetes should consistently perform better than controls in
these tasks. In addition, as with other Stroop-like tasks, C’s per-
formance could be explained without positing a perceptual synes-
thetic response. For example, it might be that C calculated the
sum of two numbers and then rapidly or automatically recalled
the color that went along with the sum rather than undergoing a
perceptual experience.
Again, more evidence is required before such purported indi-
vidual differences between synesthetes can be used to explain
inconsistent results on perceptual tasks and classify different
types of synesthetes. Thus, these various distinctions between
different synesthesia subtypes may not help at this stage of
inquiry.
We propose, however, that a promising way forward is to
ensure that there is consistency across the various studies that
examine the performance of synesthetes on different types of
paradigms. For one, many of the studies do not use the same types
of visual stimuli or displays. And for those that do, consistency
and other control measures to rule out alternatives to synesthe-
sia, such as superior memory, are often lacking. A standardized
battery to assess synesthesia might therefore include a set of tests
that are each precisely calibrated and validated to assess different
defining characteristics of synesthesia. Once a standard set of cri-
teria are used to correctly indentify and classify synesthesia, future
studies will be in a better position to examine the nature of the
condition.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on this selective review that highlights some of the many
challenges in synesthesia research, it is clear that the field needs
more convincing evidence and better tools to assess and more
fully understand the nature of this condition. As it stands, cur-
rent methods leave many questions unanswered concerning the
psychological kind or kinds under which synesthetic responses
fall. And current assessment strategies leave too much room for
error. Some of the more promising tools for better understand-
ing and assessing synesthesia are ones that may measure it more
objectively, such as those that measure brain responses during
synesthetic responses using neuroimaging techniques. These tools
could be used in tandem with some of the behavioral assessments
and experimental paradigms we have surveyed here. Based on the
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 763 | 7
Mylopoulos and Ro Synesthesia: a critical review
current state of the neuropsychological literature on synes-
thesia, much further research is required before we have a
clearer grasp on the underlying mechanisms involved with
synesthesia.
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